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Mouse Club to Hustler Magazine
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Introduction
Confusion exists in the courts over when to impose liability
on media defendants for physical injuries. While media defend-
ants are regularly subjected to claims of defamation,' invasion
of privacy,2 and sometimes intentional infliction of emotional
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1. -Professor Franklin has found 534 reported defamation decisions between 1976
and mid-1979. Franklin, Winners and Losers and Why: A Study of Defamation Liti-
gation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 455, 465. See also Franklin, Suing Media for Libe"
A Litigation Study, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 795.
2. There has been a great deal of writing on the subject of the right of privacy.
See, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890); Lar-
remore, The Law of Privacy, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 693 (1912); Green, The Right of Pri-
vacy Today, 27 ILL L. REV. 237 (1932); Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39 MIcH. L. REV.
526 (1941); Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy, 48 COLUM. L. REV.
713 (1948); Yankwich, The Right of Privacy: Its Development, Scope and Limitations,
27 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499 (1952); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960);
Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law - Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong, 31 LAW & CON.
TEMP. PROBs. 326 (1966); Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L.
REV. 1093 (1962); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the
Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis' Tort Petty and Unconstitutional As Well?, 46
TEX. L. REV. 611 (1968); Shapo, Media Injuries to Personality: An Essay on Legal
Regulation of Public Communication, 48 TEx. L. REV. 650 (1968); Wright, Defama-
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distress,3 claims of liability for physical injuries caused by me-
dia publication have most often been rejected over concern
about infringing on first amendment protection.4 Courts have
inappropriately denied liability by failing to differentiate
among kinds of media liability cases and by failing to analyze
them as they would other similar tort cases.
5
Imposing tort liability on media speech involves the type of
regulation "aimed at communicative impact" because liability is
imposed for specific effects produced by awareness of the infor-
mation conveyed.6 The communicative impact of speech is usu-
ally deemed "fully protected" and can only be restricted in
extraordinary circumstances. Only if speech falls into that
class of speech which is considered subordinate will the courts
more routinely uphold the direct regulation of content.'
Supreme Court decisions have acknowledged that some
tion, Privacy and the Public's Right to Know, 46 TEX. L. REV. 630 (1968); Bloustein,
The First Amendment and Privacy, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 41 (1974).
For cases dealing with privacy, see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
3. See Cape Publications v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982),,cert
denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983); Miller v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 187 Cal.App.3d 1463
(1986). But see Falwell v. Flynt, 108 S. Ct. 876 (1988). See also Drechsel, Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress" New Tort Libility for Mass Media, 89 DICK. L. REV.
339 (1985).
4. But see the discussion of Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., infra notes 73-80 and
accompanying text.
5. The problem has received extensive attention from legal commentators. See,
e.g., Prettyman & Hook, The Control of Media-Related Imitative Violence, 38 FED.
COMM. L.J. 317, 366-67 (1987); Hoffman, From Random House to Mickey Mouse: Lia-
bility for Negligent Publishing and Broadcasting, 21 TORTS & INS. L.J. 65 (1985);
Note, Media Liability for Injuries that Result from Television Broadcasts to Imma-
ture Audiences, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 377 (1985); Note, Products Liability and the
First Amendment: The Liability of Publishers for Failure to Warn, 59 IND. L.J. 503
(1984); Note, Tort Liability for Nonlibelous Negligent Statements: First Amendment
Consideration, 93 YALE L.J. 744 (1984); Spak, Predictable Harm: Should the Media Be
Liable?, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 671; Urwin, Tort Liability of Broadcasters for Audience Acts
of Imitative Violence, 19 PUB. ENT. ADVERT. & ALLIED FIELDS L.Q. 314 (1981); Note,
Tort Liability of the Media for Audience Acts of Violence: A Constitutional Analysis,
52 S. CAL. L. REV. 529 (1979).
6. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 581 (1978). Professor Tribe sug-
gests that speech regulation can be viewed as one of two types, that which is aimed at
communicative impact or that which is "aimed at non-communicative impact but nev-
ertheless having an adverse effect on communicative opportunity." Tort liability falls
under the type aimed at communicative impact since it singles out "actions for gov-
ernment control or penalty either (a) because of the specific viewpoint such actions
express, or (b) because of the specific effects produced by awareness of the informa-
tion such actions impart." Id. at 580 (emphasis added).
7. "[E]xcept when low value speech is at issue, the Court has invalidated almost
every content-based restriction that it has considered in the past quarter-century."
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speech is inherently less worthy of protection than other
speech. In C0haplinsky v. New Hampshire,8 the Court observed
that
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any constitutional problem. Those in-
clude the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous and the
insulting or fighting words.... [These classes of speech are] no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be de-
rived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.9
Since C0taplinsky, the Court appears to have consistently strati-
fied speech, finding certain classes to be subordinate to others
on a hierarchical scale.10
Efforts to impose liability on media induced physical injuries
commonly focus on the incitement category of subordinated
speech." Media liability is, consequently, often limited to inju-
ries arising only when the incitement test of Brandenburg v.
Ohio is met.12
Brandenburgi3 reversed the criminal conviction of a Ku
Klux Klan leader who had been charged with violating Ohio's
criminal syndication act. Overruling an earlier decision which
had upheld a similar syndication law,' 4 the Court held that ad-
vocacy of violence was protected so long as it did not intention-
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment," 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189,
196 (1983).
8. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
9. Id. at 571-72 (footnote omitted).
10. Certain classes of speech were deemed subordinate to other, more highly pro-
tected speech as exemplified in the following cases: New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982) (child pornography); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (commercial speech); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (commercial speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 518 (1942) (fighting words); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per
curiam) (incitement); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (libel); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel); and Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973) (obscenity).
11. See, e.g., Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 802, 803 (S.D. Tex.
1983), motion to dismiss denied, 583 F. Supp. 1566 (S.D. Tex. 1984), cert. denied, 56
U.S.L.W. 3647 (1988) (discussed infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text). C.
Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 939 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975), dis-
cussed infra at notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
12. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
13. Id.
14. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
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ally incite people to imminent lawless action.15
The Brandenburg test is commonly construed to require the
fulfillment of three elements for speech to be deemed incite-
ment: "(1) the speaker subjectively intended incitement; (2) in
context, the words used were likely to produce imminent law-
less action; and (3) the words used by the speaker objectively
encouraged and urged incitement."16
The Brandenburg standard provides an almost impenetrable
barrier to plaintiffs seeking redress for injuries caused by me-
dia defendants.' 7 Most media portrayals do not involve direct
advocacy of unlawful conduct, but will only indirectly incite
someone to action.
However, it may not always be appropriate to apply the lim-
its against criminal sanctions imposed by Brandenburg in civil
liability cases.'" Some speech may be regulated more appropri-
ately according to traditional tort typologies. Historically, com-
mon law tort doctrine in specific contexts has routinely
imposed civil liability for communications proximately causing
injuries. Carrying the traditional common law tort analysis
into the realm of the mass media, within some narrowly de-
fined classifications, should prove more constructive than rou-
tinely imposing the Brandenburg incitement standard.
The purpose of this Article is to suggest how some cases in-
volving physical injuries caused by media defendants should be
classified into traditional tort typologies. The proper differenti-
ation of these cases would insure against diminution of first
amendment rights, minimize unreasonable risks of physical in-
juries, and provide just compensation for culpably caused
injuries.
15. 395 U.S. at 447.
16. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 864 (1986) (em-
phasis in original). Professor Tribe suggests that the Brandenburg test combines the
best of two previous views: Judge Learned Hand's incitement test and Justices
Holmes' and Brandeis' concern that harm is likely to occur-usually expressed as the
clear and present danger test. L. TRIBE, supra ,note 6, at 616.
17. See, e.g., Olivia N. v. NBC, 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981), cert.
denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982).
Some commentators have suggested that under Brandenburg, only direct incite-
ment is sufficient to pass the standard. Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexam-
ined Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concept, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1185 (1970).
Others have felt that it "is at best unclear as to whether the requirement [of direct
incitement] has been adopted." Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech & First
Amendment Methodology, 25 UCLA L. REV. 915, 947-48 n.206 (1978).
18. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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Three categories of cases are presented. Category One con-
tains cases involving instructions or directions promulgated by
media defendants. This section argues that media defendants
should be subject to the same negligence liability which has tra-
ditionally been applied to instruction cases. Category Two con-
siders potential tort liability for media sponsored or promoted
activities and examines the liability imposed on promoters and
sponsors. Again it is argued that there should be no distinction
between media and non-media defendants. Finally, Category
Three includes cases involving media stimulated violence
which causes physical injuries. In contrast to Categories One
and Two, negligence is inapplicable. Except for certain limited
exceptions involving obscene or commercial speech, the balanc-
ing test to determine liability would require that the value of
ideas be weighed impermissibly against their potential for caus-
ing harm.
I
Category One: Instructions
In Walt Disney Productions, Inc. v. Shannon,19 the Georgia
Supreme Court considered a child plaintiff's suit against com-
panies responsible for the broadcast of the "Mickey Mouse
Club" on television. On the particular show that was the sub-
ject of the lawsuit, the following was announced: "Our special
feature on today's show is all about the magic you can create
with sound effects. ' '20 Following this announcement, one of the
participants in the special feature showed the audience "how to
reproduce the sound of a tire coming off an automobile by put-
ting a BB pellet inside a 'large, round balloon,' filling the bal-
loon with air, and rotating the BB inside the balloon. "21
Shannon Craig, the eleven-year-old plaintiff, attempted to re-
peat the sound effect he had just seen on television by using a
piece of lead twice the size of a BB pellet and placing it inside a
"large skinny balloon."'  Craig inflated the balloon and it
burst, propelling the lead into Craig's eye, partially blinding
19. 247 Ga. 402, 276 S.E.2d 580 (1981).
20. I& at 402, 276 S.E_2d at 581.
21. Id
22. Id The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment
under general tort principles and on first amendment grounds. The state court of
appeals reversed the summary judgment, declining to rule as a matter of law that the
defendants could not be held liable. Id
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him. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the first amend-
ment banned the suit.
2 3
The court ruled that the first amendment required greater
protection for the media defendant than would be afforded
under the ordinary tort typology of negligence.24 The Georgia
court considered the Brandenburg test, concluding that it was
inappropriate to the case.25 Instead, the Disney court adopted a
clear and present danger standard whereby "an utterance can
be suppressed or penalized on the ground that it tends to incite
an immediate breach of peace, 'if the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evil that Congress has a right to prevent.' "I
Under this standard, the court balanced the risk of injury
against the harm caused by suppression of speech. The court
concluded that there may have been a foreseeable risk of in-
jury. However, only one out of fourteen million children who
viewed the program actually suffered an injury. Consequently,
the court held that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a
finding of clear and present danger of injury and ruled in favor
of the defendants.-7 The court, expressing the concern that
there could be a future chilling effect on speech, decided that
23. Id.
24. Id. at 404, 276 S.E.2d at 582.
25. Id. at 403 n.2, 276 S.E.2d at 582 n.2. See the discussion of the Brandenburg
standard, supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text. In Disney, the court reasoned
that even if Brandenburg was applicable, there was nothing in what the plaintiff was
allegedly invited to do that was "imminently lawless."
26. Id at 404, 276 S.E.2d at 582 (quoting Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 41, 42 (1919)).
The clear and present danger test may actually represent an attempt at a somewhat
easier to reach standard than Brandenburg. The Brandenburg test was developed in
the 1960s when the Supreme Court was attempting to protect the advocacy of unpopu-
lar ideas. See J. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 16, at 862. Before
Brandenburg, the clear and present danger test had been viewed as a balancing test
which could sometimes result in the suppression of speech. Under the clear and pres-
ent danger balancing test, courts weighed the competing interest of free speech
against the seriousness of the danger to be regulated. It could sometimes result in
severe limitations on speech, since the danger did not have to be imminent or even
lawless, but merely great. Thus, in one case in the 1950s, the court found that the
advocacy of violent overthrow of the government could be suppressed even if doomed
from "the outset because of inadequate numbers or power of the revolutionists" be-
cause the danger of violent overthrow of the government was a very grave danger.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1951).
27. 247 Ga. at 405 & n.4, 276 S.E.2d at 582 & n.4. The Georgia Supreme Court
distinguished the Disney case from "'Pied Piper' cases, in which street ... vendors
attract children into the street [and] have been held liable for failure to protect them
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the risk of suppression of speech was considerably greater.'9
Thus, the opinion reasoned that the minimal danger presented
by the speech, as evidenced by the low number of reported inju-
ries, did not outweigh the greater risk of a chilling effect on
speech.29
The court in Disney would have more properly decided the
against traffic." I& at 405, 276 S.E.2d at 583 (quoting W. PROSSEM, LAW OF TORTS 172
(4th ed. 1971)).
An example of one such "Pied Piper" case is Roberts v. American Brewed Coffee,
40 Ohio App. 2d 273, 319 N.E.2d 218 (1973). In Roberts, the plaintiff, a four-year-old,
was struck by a car when attempting to cross a street to reach the defendant's ice
cream truck. The plaintiff accused the defendant of negligence for stopping the ice
cream truck at a spot where there was no intersection or crosswalk, when the defend-
ant knew children would be encouraged, by the sight of the truck and the music it
played, to cross the street. In reversing an order dismissing the complaint, the court
quoted a previous Ohio Appellate Decision: "for children to cross without direct su-
pervision is fraught with danger.... In our opinion, the risk to a child is obvious and
substantial. The defendants owed a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the
child customer from that obvious hazard." Id at 275, 314 N.E.2d at 220 (quoting
Thomas v. Goodies Ice Cream Co., 13 Ohio App. 2d 67, 68, 233 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1968)).
See also Neal v. Shiels, Inc., 166 Conn. 3, 347 A.2d 102, (1973); Ellis v. Trower Frozen
Prods., Inc., 264 Cal. App. 2d 499, 70 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1968); Reid v. Swindler, 249 S.C.
483, 154 S.E.2d 910 (1967). The Disney court concluded that the "Pied Piper" cases
require "(1) ... an express or implied invitation extended to the child to do something
posing a foreseeable risk of injury and (2) the defendant must be chargeable with
maintaining or providing the child with the instrumentality causing the injury." 247
Ga. at 405, 276 S.E.2d at 583. The Disney court stated that the second element was
"undisputably absent" and, consequently, the risk must constitute a clear and present
danger of injury, and not merely ordinary negligence. Id,
It is not clear how the court in the Disney case could characterize "Pied Piper"
cases as requiring that the defendant be chargeable with "maintaining or providing
the child with the instrument causing the injury." I& The section from Dean Pros-
ser's treatise includes "Pied Piper" cases as among those where a defendant's stan-
dard of reasonable conduct must take into account the likelihood that children will
behave with less care and prudence than adults. Consequently, the treatise cites,
along with "Pied Piper" cases, the danger that a child will dash into the path of a car,
meddle with a turntable, or scramble for candy that is thrown at them. W. PROSSER,
LAw OF TORTS 172-73 nn.43-44, 477 (4th ed. 1971). Yet it is a misreading of both the
treatise qnd the actual facts of the "Pied Piper" cases to infer a need for liability to
depend on supplying an instrumentality.
Further, the particular vulnerability of children does not affect the general tort
practice of imposing liability for negligent acts or misrepresentations involving the
risk of physical harm. The Restatement of Torts commentary expressly recognizes
that the unreasonable "risk may lie in the probability that the third person may con-
duct himself carelessly or unskillfully, or without adequate preparation or warning, in
doing an act which the actor's conduct is intended or likely to cause him to do." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 303 comment c (1965). Section 303 states: "An act is
negligent if the actor intends it to affect, or realizes or should realize that it is likely to
affect, the conduct of another, a third person, or an animal in such a manner as to
create an unreasonable risk of harm to the other." Id,
28. 247 Ga. at 404 & n.2, 276 S.E.2d at 582 & n.2.
29. I& at 405 & n.4, 276 S.E.2d at 582 & n.4.
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case under a negligence theory of liability. Cases such as Dis-
ney should be treated in the same manner as courts have
treated erroneous instruction cases outside of the media con-
text. Liability has frequently been imposed on manufacturers
for errors in instructions in navigational chartss° and for errors
in instructions accompanying products.3 ' Indeed, not only has
negligence liability been imposed on chart makers and other
manufacturers, but strict liability for defects in the product's
design has been imposed regardless of fault in the manufactur-
ing and design process.3 2
The purveyor of a product may often be held liable, even
without proof of negligence, for the dangerous condition of the
product if it results in an injury to the user.3s This notion has
30. Saloomey v. Jeppeson & Co., 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983); Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co. v. Jeppeson & Co., 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1981).
31. Jackson v. Badwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 252 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Pa. 1966);
Wichman v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 117 F. Supp. 857 (W.D. Mo. 1954). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 397 comment b (1977) which states:
Articles which do not disclose to the ordinary intelligence their properties,
either by their appearance or by the information contained on their labels,
must be bought and used in reliance upon the competence and care of those
who put them out to make them safe for the purposes for which they are
advertised and sold, and in reliance upon the directions, in the advertisement
or on the containers, given as adequate to make it safe to use the chattel in
the manner directed. The maker of such article is, therefore, required not
only to exercise reasonable care to adopt a formula which will make the chat-
tel safe for its advertised use, but also to exercise reasonable care to make
such directions as he appends to the chattel adequate to secure its safe use. If
the chattel is one which can only be safely used for the purposes for which it
is sold if adequate directions are given, a maker is required to exercise care to
bring such directions home to those who may be expected to use it. If the
improper use of the chattel involves grave risk of serious bodily harm or
death, the maker of it does not satisfy his duty by informing the person to
whom the chattel is supplied. In such case, he is required to make the chattel
carry its own directions by placing them upon the container.
32. The definition of design defect may be open to question. Rather than attempt-
ing to define design defects in terms of consumer expectations, strict products liability
should be viewed in terms of traditional notions of strict liability. Traditional strict
liability avoided the definitional ambiguities of the concept of what constitutes a de-
fective product by focusing on the dangerousness of the activity engaged in by the
defendant. See Diamond, Eliminating the "Defect" in Design Strict Liability Theory,
34 HASTINGS L.J. 529 (1983).
33. See W. KEETON, D.DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
TORTS 692-93 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]; Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 372 P.2d 897, 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963).
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977) adopted the theory of Green-
man and states in relevant part:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
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been termed strict products liability by both the Second Re-
statement of Torts and case law. While the application of strict
products liability to media defendants is probably inappropri-
ate, the reasoning of strict products liability cases argues for, at
the very least, the imposition of negligence liability in the mass
media context.
The courts have advanced at least three rationales for hold-
ing the manufacturer of a product strictly liable. These reasons
apply equally to some mass media entities.
First, courts and commentators have suggested that the costs
associated with injuries resulting from unreasonably dangerous
defective products are best borne by the manufacturers." Man-
ufacturers are viewed as being in the best position to spread the
risk of loss among all who buy the product.35
It is also argued that strict products liability will actively pro-
mote safety.3 Allowing injured plaintiffs to avail themselves
of the theory of strict products liability will "cause manufactur-
ers to take cautionary steps to prevent the marketing of dan-
gerously defective products."' '
A third rationale for strict products liability is the notion that
the costs and institutional stresses on the judicial system out-
weigh the need for proof of fault of negligence under the cir-
cumstances of the sale of an unreasonably dangerous and
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold ....
34. Smith v. Home Light & Power Co., 734 P.2d 1051, 1058 (Colo. 1987); Carrao v.
Heitler, 117 A.D.2d 308, 502 N.Y.S.2d 424, 427 (1986); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984); Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1434 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1983); Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 862 (5th Cir. 1967);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
35. Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1434 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983).
36. First Nat'l Bank v. Nor-Am Agr. Prods., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 537 P.2d 682, 695
(N.M. Ct. App. 1975); Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc., 92 N.M. 575, 576, 592 P.2d 175,
176 (N.M. 1979).
37. First Nat7 Bank, 88 N.M. at 87, 537 P.2d at 695; but see Raleigh, 7The "State of
the Art" in Product Liability: A New Look at an Old "Defense" 4 OHIo NORTH L.
REv. 249 (1977). Raleigh argues that strict liability applied to product manufacturers
may actually operate to chill innovation in new product design and manufacture.
Thus, while we may arguably create a safer world through the imposition of strict
products liability, we may find fewer products available.
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defective product.3 8 To some degree, this reasoning hinges on a
limited and unambiguous definition of product defect.
39
When and if strict products liability should be applied, and
what in fact constitutes a defect in the context of media in-
duced physical injury remains problematic. Arguably, how-
ever, the rationales of strict products liability, including the
manufacturer's ability to spread the economic loss due to in-
jury, increased safety precautions, and allocation of stress on
the judicial system, could apply equally as well to mass media
products as they do to any other mass produced consumer item.
Mass produced writings are commonly the focus of strict
products liability actions. Often, the defective part of a product
may be a set of accompanying instructions, or the failure to pro-
vide adequate warnings. While there may be some distinctions
between defective warnings and defective instructions, each
case clearly involves that which is mass produced speech, re-
sulting in physical injury to the consumer.4°
A recent case, Emerson G.M. Diesel v. AK Enterprises,41 up-
held a judgment against a manufacturer in a strict products lia-
bility action for injury resulting from insufficient instructions
provided with shipping components. The manufacturer failed
to specifically instruct its customers on the installation of tem-
perature sensing devices. When the temperature sensing de-
vice was left out, the engine of the ship was destroyed. The
court applied strict products liability theory and found that the
inadequate instruction rendered the product defective.42
38. See First Nat Bank, 88 N.M. at 87, 537 P.2d at 695. The imposition of strict
products liability will cause "preventive measures [to be taken which] may avert trag-
edies ... and thereby save our system the cost of lawsuits."
39. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, at 693.
40. Warnings and instructions are distinguishable since the duty to warn is not
necessarily eliminated by furnishing instructions if additional dangers may be encoun-
tered if the instructions are not properly followed. See AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY 3D 19 § 32:15 at 2b (1987) ("Bland instructions, which if followed involve no
risk, are no substitute for a skull and crossbones warning."). But see Antcliff v. Stock
Employees Credit Union, 414 Mich. 624, 630, 327 N.W.2d 814, 820 (1982), noting that
the distinction between instructions and warnings is nebulous at best and there may
be little reason to attempt to distinguish them.
Commentators and courts have suggested that warnings and instructions should be
distinguished. One treatise points out that "[i]nstructions are to be followed to secure
the most efficient or satisfactory use of the product; warnings are instructions as to
dangers that may arise if the instructions are not followed." AMERICAN LAW OF PROD-
ucrs LIABILiTY 3D, supra, § 32:15 at 26.
41. 732 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1984).
42. I& at 1475. See also Conticarriers & Terminals, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 593
F. Supp. 400, 403 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (failure of manufacturer to properly instruct vessel's
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The failure to provide sufficient written warning has often
resulted in a product being termed unreasonably dangerous
even though the product is otherwise free of other design or
manufacturing defects. The producers of a product have been
found liable in cases where warnings attached to products, 43 the
warnings in booklets and manuals accompanying products, 44 as
well as verbal warnings,45 were found to render a product dan-
gerously defective. The courts focus in these cases on the inad-
equacy of the speech to protect the consumer from what is
otherwise a safe product.46
Strict products liability has been regularly imposed in at least
one area of what may be termed mass communications: the
mass produced aviation chart. Aviation charts are essentially
maps, although they contain much more detailed information
than would commonly be found on a road map. Indeed. they
may actually be said to graphically present instructions.47
In Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 4 the court imposed strict
products liability on the chart publisher, despite the fact that
the error in data was attributed to the government.4  The de-
fective nature of the chart was found to be the proximate cause
of a resulting plane crash. Since the court ruled that strict
products liability applied, the finding that the chart's defect
was the proximate cause of the crash was sufficient to hold the
owner and installer resulting in damage to ship, properly resulted in the application
of strict products liability); Hoychick v. Gulf States Toyota, Inc., 386 So. 2d 681 (Ct.
App. La. 1980) (sufficient instructions were given in a car owner's manual concerning
the proper method in removing the car's oil filter and, thus, the product was not ren-
dered defective).
43. See Global Truck & Equip. Co. v. Palmer Mach. Works, 628 F. Supp. 641 (N.D.
Miss. 1986).
44. See Stapleton v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 608 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1979);
Wolfe v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 346, 350-51, 376 N.E.2d 143, 146 (1979).
45. See Cruz v. Texaco, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 777 (S.D. Ill. 1984).
46. See Global Truck & Equip. Co. v. Palmer Mach. Works, 628 F. Supp. 641 (N.D.
Miss. 1986).
47. There are essentially three types of aviation charts available: enroute charts,
describing large geographic areas, e.g., several states; area charts, which provide a
more detailed account of a local metropolitan area; and approach charts, which depict
the precise area near a runway. Approach charts, often the subject of litigation, may
include information about obstructions along an approach course, as well as symbols
and abbreviations informing a pilot of pertinent information on a given approach, all
on a 4x7 inch card. See McLowan, Liability of the Chartmaker, 1980 INs. COUNCIL J.
360.
48. 707 F:2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
49. Id at 677.
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publisher liable for the death of the pilots
Courts considering whether to impose strict products liability
to media representations are most concerned with whether
there is actually a product involved. The court in Saloomey
found the airplane chart to be a product since there had been
no "substantial change in contents - they were simply mass-
produced."'" The mass production of the charts distinguished
them from the situation involving the rendition of service
where strict products liability does not apply. As one court has
pointed out, "[i]f suitable for mass marketing, the information
is in some sense a fungible good for which manufacturer[s]
placing it on the market must assume responsibility."52
The majority of cases outside of the chart area involving the
mass media have not found media creations to be products. A
recent case, Cohen & Co., Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 5' held
that a credit report issued by Dun & Bradstreet was not a prod-
uct. The court sought to distinguish the credit report from the
chart cases by explaining that the charts "did not constitute
speech protected by the First Amendment. ' ' 4 Indeed, the court
found that the "imposition of liability without fault on the pub-
lisher of a credit report.., would be just a short step from the
imposition of liability without fault on an investigative re-
porter, a political columnist or a documentary filmmaker."'
Within the realm of books, the courts have been quick to ac-
knowledge that books are products, but only to the extent that
the book can be said to constitute the tangible items of printing
50. Id Other cases involving charts manufactured by Jeppesen have come out
similarly. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Jeppesen Co., 642 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.
1981); De Bardelben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1971).
51. Saloomey, 707 F.2d at 676.
52. Halstead v. United States, 535 F. Supp. 782, 791 (D. Conn. 1982); See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments c, f (1965). A service is said to have been
provided, rather than the sale of a good or product where "(1) there is a pure personal
service transaction and no tangible chattel is involved in the transaction, as in the case
of a soils engineer who gives his opinion on whether or not a particular building site is
suitable; or, (2) a defendant contracts to 'render service' in repairing or installing a
non-defective product (tangible chattel)." McLowan, supra note 47, at 363.
53. 629 F.Supp. 1425 (D. Conn. 1986). The court recognized that "the Supreme
Court has indicated that credit reports, while not meriting the level of protection ac-
corded to debate on matters of public concern, are nonetheless a form of speech pro-
tected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments" (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 Sup.Ct. 2939 (1985)).
54. Id at 1431 n.8.
55. I& at 1431.
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and binding, and other items of a physical nature." In Cardozo
v. True,57 the court distinguished between the tangible proper-
ties and the thoughts and ideas conveyed by a cookbook." The
court suggested that in cases such as these, imposing strict lia-
bility would restrict the flow of ideas. "The common theme
running through these decisions is that ideas hold a privileged
position in our society. They are not equivalent to commercial
products."5 9
Judicial attempts to articulate a truly principled distinction
between the in part non-verbal communications in navigational
charts from a presumably non-pictorial credit report may, like
other borderline cases, be problematic. Nevertheless, the in-
tangible nature of communication, whether written or broad-
cast, renders it unlike the ordinary commercial product.60
Indeed, such media speech is more akin to services where liabil-
ity clearly lies in negligence, not in a strict products liability
action.6' As with services, such as an attorney providing ad-
vice,62 or a travel agency selecting transportation for a client,s
it is the communication, and not a tangible physical good for its
own sake, which is being sold. Consequently, strict products
liability appears inappropriate.
However, writings and oral communications may often ex-
pose one to a negligence action. Most of these cases occur in an
interpersonal communication setting. Yet, there is no reason
56. Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). See also
Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, 565 F. Supp. 802, 803 (S.D. Tex. 1983), 814 F.2d 1017 (5th
Cir. 1987), cert denied 56 U.S.L.W. 3647 (1988).
57. 342 So. 2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
58. Id. at 1056. The case involved a cookbook which was an anthology of recipes
using tropical fruits and vegetables. Ingrid Cardozo purchased the cookbook and,
while following a recipe for the Dasheen plant (elephant ears), ate a small slice of the
plant and became severely ill, requiring medical care. Id. at 1054. The plaintiff al-
leged that the book had inadequate instructions. Additionally, Cardozo claimed fail-
ure to warn that uncooked Dasheen roots are poisonous and breach of the implied
warranty that the book was reasonably fit for its intended use. Id. at 1054-55.
59. Id. at 1056.
60. See Note, Tort.law - TeleViolence: Should Broadcasters Be Liable?, 6 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 897, 899 n.20 (1984).
61. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, at 720.
62. Id. at 186. See, e.g., Day v. Rosenthal, 170 Cal. App. 3d 1125, 217 Cal. Rptr. 89,
rev. denied, 43 Cal. 3d 617, cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 1267 (1985).
63. Pena v. Site World Travel, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 642, 644, 152 Cal. Rptr. 17, 18
(1978)(travel agency selecting transportation not liable for injury suffered by plaintiff
on a travel bus); see also Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., Inc., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606,
610-11, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973)(furnishing of blood provides a service and is not a sale
of goods, strict products liability is inapplicable).
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for the courts to distinguish such cases on a media-nonmedia
basis. Instead, the courts should impose the traditional tort ty-
pology of negligence if the elements of the tort are met.
Thus, within the area of professional malpractice, doctors are
often held liable for failing to communicate fully to a patient
the effects of an operation. This is the so-called doctrine of in-
formed consent which requires doctors to disclose the poten-
tially harmful effects of a treatment to a patient so that he or
she can make an informed decision as to whether or not to go
through with the treatment." Here the doctors are held to a
negligence standard rather than strict liability since they pro-
vide a service and not a product.6e
Similarly, attorneys may be held liable in a malpractice ac-
tion for negligently preparing written or verbal communica-
tions. The writings of the attorney, while often characterized
as "work products" are actually part of his or her services and,
thus, do not subject the lawyer to a strict liability standard.'
Courts have sometimes recognized that the judicial system
should not refrain from imposing liability for negligence
merely because speech is disseminated widely. For example, in
Reminga v. United States67 the United States was found negli-
gent under the Federal Tort Claims Act for failing to show the
proper location of a television tower in the proximity of the air-
port on a chart it produced6s The court considered the im-
proper notation on the mass produced maps as subjecting the
defendant to the same potential liability as the failure of the
Coast Guard to properly operate a lighthouse 69 or the failure of
an air traffic controller to inform an airplane pilot of the cor-
64. See generally, D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 22.01
(1981); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, at 189-93.
65. Salis v. United States, 522 F. Supp 989 (M.D. Penn. 1981); Truman v. Thomas,
27 Cal. 3d 285, 611 P.2d 902, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1980).
66. Recent examples include: Koehler v. Pulvers, 614 F. Supp. 829 (S.D. Cal.
1985) (attorney liable for negligent opinion transmitted to clients); Pasternak v. Sagit-
tarius Recording Co., 617 F. Supp. 1514 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (misrepresentation in opin-
ion letter by attorney to client).
67. 631 F.2d 449, 451-52 (6th Cir. 1980).
68. The chart was a "sectional map" depicting a specific zone around a metropoli-
tan area. Id at 450.
The court probably did not hiave occasion to consider whether to impose strict prod-
ucts liability since prevailing interpretations of the Federal Tort Claims Act precludes
recovery based on strict liability. See Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 803 (1972); PROS-
SER & KEETON, supra note 33, at 1034. Consequently, the only issue facing the Rem-
inga court, was whether negligence liability would be appropriate.
69. 631 F.2d at 452 (citing Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955)).
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rect prevailing visibility.7 °
The Reminga court, if not precluded by the Federal Torts
Claims Act from doing so, might have followed reasoning simi-
lar to that of the Saloomey chart case and imposed strict prod-
ucts liability based on the map's mass production. On the other
hand, maps may be more akin to services than to tangible prod-
ucts and should not, therefore, be treated under strict products
liability. What is ironic, and particularly inappropriate, how-
ever, is for courts, in cases like Disney, to find that mass-pro-
duction, which, if anything, argues for strict products liability,
is a basis for immunizing the media from ordinary negligence.
The fact that the negligent instructions which caused the in-
jury in Disney occurred in a mass communications context
should not generate a different result than would occur in ordi-
nary interpersonal settings, as in communications between air
traffic controller and pilot or lawyer and client. While strict
products liability should probably not be imposed on media de-
fendants for purely verbal communication,7 1 an action in negli-
gence should not be precluded where it traditionally has arisen
in interpersonal communication settings simply because a me-
dia defendant is involved. At the very least, mass production
and the harm mass defects can potentially cause, strengthens
the argument for liability. Nor is it likely that imposing liabil-
ity for negligence would pose constitutional problems in this
context. The United States Supreme Court has required a
showing of no more than "fault" or negligence in private defa-
mation cases against the media.72 Victims of physical injury
would appear to command an even more compelling justifica-
tion for imposing liability for injuries caused by media
negligence.
II
Category Two: Media Sponsored Activities As a
Basis for Liability
Not only has the media been insulated from liability when
providing instructions, but courts have also given undue protec-
70. Id. (citing Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir.), cert de-
nied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967)).
71. Maps and charts may create a special category on the fringes of products lia-
bility, but this Article does not decide if the analysis in cases like Saloomey was
appropriate.
72. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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tion to media defendants when sponsoring or promoting activi-
ties. When media defendants act as sponsors and promoters
they, like non-media defendants, should be subject to negli-
gence liability.
In Weirum v. RKO General, Inc.," the California Supreme
Court upheld a wrongful death verdict against the owner of a
Los Angeles radio station (KHJ). The station, which com-
manded a 48 percent plurality of the teenage audience in the
Los Angeles area, sponsored a promotion entitled "The Super
Summer Spectacular," which was designed to make the radio
station "more exciting."'74 The promotion included a contest
broadcast in which KHJ disc jockey and television personality,
"The Real Don Steele," traveled in a conspicuous red automo-
bile to different locations in the Los Angeles area.75 Periodi-
cally, the station would broadcast information on Don Steele's
destination to its listeners and offer a cash prize to the first to
physically locate him and also meet other specified conditions.
Two teenage listeners rushed to locate Steele based on broad-
cast clues. One of them forced a third car off the road, result-
ing in the driver's death.76
The California Supreme Court rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that the first amendment protected the radio station from
civil liability.77 The court observed that "the First Amendment
does not sanction the infliction of physical injury merely be-
cause achieved by word, rather than act."'78 The court described
the giveaway contest as "a competitive scramble in which the
thrill of the chase to be the one and only victor was intensified
by the live broadcasts which accompanied the pursuit.
79
A subsequent California appellate decision, in commenting
on the "broad" language used in Weirum, emphasized its rela-
tively limited application. "The Weirum broadcasts actively
and repeatedly encouraged listeners to speed to announced lo-
cations. Liability was imposed on the broadcaster for urging
listeners to act in an inherently dangerous manner. '"80
73. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
74. Id. at 44, 539 P.2d at 38, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 45, 539 P.2d at 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 471.
77. Id. at 48, 539 P.2d at 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 472.
78. Id.
79. Id at 48, 539 P.2d at 41, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 473.
80. Olivia N. v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 126 Cal. App.3d 488, 496, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888,
894, (1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1108 (1982).
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In fact, it is questionable whether the broadcaster's state-
ments "urged" listeners to engage in "inherently dangerous
driving" or encouraged "speeding," if that word is used to con-
note unlawful speeds. What the radio station clearly did, how-
ever, was effectively promote a group activity which, without
even promoting unlawful or dangerous driving, posed unrea-
sonable risks as the race was conducted. In this sense, Weirum
clearly conforms with other decisions imposing liability for the
negligent manner in which a race is conducted by its promoters.
Promoters are routinely held liable for negligence in organiz-
ing races. In American Motorcycle Association v. Superior
Court,81 the plaintiff sued the promoter of a cross-country mo-
torcycle race for having negligently "designed, managed, super-
vised and administered the race."8 2 The California Supreme
Court acknowledged that such liability was possible and deter-
mined that the sponsor could seek indemnity from a joint
tortfeasorss Indeed, in most cases promoters who are negligent
are liable unless they can present evidence of a valid express or
implied assumption of risk by participants. "
Nevertheless, courts continue to fail to apply traditional tort
decisions to activities promoted by the media. In Bill v. Supe-
rior Court,' the plaintiff sued the producers of an allegedly vi-
olent film after she was shot by other patrons also leaving a
showing of the movie "Boulevard Nights" at the Alhambra
Theater in San Francisco. The plaintiff alleged that the pro-
ducer "knew or should have known that said movie was a vio-
lent movie and would attract certain members of the public
who would prove to be violent."" Consequently, the plaintiff
argued that the defendant was negligent in its failure to warn
the plaintiff or "to take sufficient steps to protect patrons.., at
81. 20 Cal. 3d. 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
82. Id. at 584, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
83. Id at 604, 578 P.2d at 916, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
84. In some jurisdictions, implied assumption of risk may only partially negate a
claim of negligence. Under comparative fault analysis, each tortfeasor is responsible
for his proportionate share of a claim, and a claim is not negated wholly by the im-
plied assumption of risk by one party. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975).
See Celli v. Sports Car Club, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 511, 105 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1972)
(holding the defendant promoter liable in the absence of an express release form by
the plaintiff); Okura v. U.S. Cycling Fed'n, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1462, 231 Cal. Rptr. 429
(1986) (promoter of bicycle race liable, but for the existence of an express waiver).
85. 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625 (1982).
86. 1& at 1005, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
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or near the theatre." ' Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant represented to the general public that the movie
"could be viewed in safety.""
The traditional duty to provide crowd control and security at
a media sponsored event is to be distinguished from efforts to
impose liability because the content of the media event is found
to invoke hostile audience reactions." The Bill court failed to
make this distinction, choosing instead to blend the notion of
crowd control with the content of the speech the media is
presenting.
The plaintiff in Bill claimed that the movie being exhibited
would tend to attract violence-prone individuals9 Thus, as
stated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,9 the traditional
tort duty would require an exhibitor to "exercise reasonable
care... to protect the members of the public by controlling the
conduct of the third persons."92
The court ignored this traditional tort analysis and instead
held that the first amendment rights of the defendants would
be violated if the defendants were made to account for the pos-
sible violent nature of the crowd attending the show.93 The
court reasoned that
if the showing of the movie "Boulevard Nights" tended to at-
tract violence-prone persons to the vicinity of the theater, it is
precisely because of the film's content, and for no other rea-
son.... It is thus predictable that the exposure to liability in
such situations would have a chilling effect upon the selection
of subject matter for movies."
87. d
88. I&
89. See infra, text accompanying notes 104-27 for a discussion of media stimulated
violence. See also United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
90. Bill, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 1008, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
91. Section 344 imposes a duty on landowners who hold their property open to the
public to protect members of the public by controlling the conduct of third persons:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business
purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon
the land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental, negli-
gent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by the
failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to
(a) discover that such acts are being done or are likely to be done, or
(b) give a warning adequate to enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or
otherwise to protect them against it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 344 (1977).
92. Id
93. 137 Cal. App. 3d at 1007, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 628.
94. 1&
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Thus, the court concluded that any risks associated with the
presentation's content could not lead to liability without consti-
tuting an unconstitutional restraint on speech.
Tort decisions have traditionally demanded adequate security
and logistical protection for those attending public perform-
ances.5 Whether it is a baseball game, a rock concert, or an
evening of poetry, the type of event and the patrons expected to
attend may impact on what reasonable precautions are neces-
sary to insure the safety of the crowd. The percentage of
juveniles and a variety of other specific factors, including loca-
tion, must be considered in determining what are reasonable
procedures for crowd controlY6
The Bill case is in part comparable to cases which impose
upon operators or owners of entertainment attractions, such as
motion picture theaters, a duty to protect their audiences from
assaults by other patrons. For example, in Moran v. Valley
Forge Drive-In Theatre Inc.,w' the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
upheld a $12,000 verdict against the owners and operators of a
drive-in theatre for the personal injury the plaintiff suffered
from a lighted firecracker explosion while he was in the thea-
ter's restroom. Prior to entering the restroom, the plaintiff had
observed six or eight teenagers acting in a "boisterous manner"
near the restroom.98 The record indicated that on frequent oc-
casions prior to the plaintiff's injury, firecrackers had been ex-
ploded and other acts of rowdyism had taken place."
Following Section 344 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 0 0 the court held that the security precautions provided
95. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 33, at 392.
96. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Home Indem. Ins. Co., 361 So. 2d 1227 (IL Ct. App.
1978). The court, in imposing liability for a failure to turn lights on at intermission of
a rock concert, took into consideration the nature of the crowd and the fact that they
might be a "little out of control" and need lights turned on at intermission in order to
move safely about the auditorium.
97. 431 Pa. 432, 246 A.2d 875 (1968).
98. Id. at 435, 246 A.2d at 877.
99. Id See also Wometco Theatres Corp. v. Rath, 123 So. 2d 472, 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1960). In this case, a patron of the theater was knocked against a seat and onto
the floor when a suspected child molester attempted to escape apprehension by the
theater management. The issue was whether or not the theater was liable to its pa-
trons for the negligent actions of another patron. Id at 473. The court held that since
there "is nothing in the record to indicate that the defendant's employees should have
known or anticipated this violent reaction," the owner or operator should not be held
liable for the injuries to the other patron. Id
100. Moran, 431 Pa. at 436-37, 246 A.2d at 878. See also supra note 91, for text of
Section 344 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.
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by the theater owners for its patrons must take into account
the general nature of those who would be attracted to the
exhibition.101
The Bill case differs significantly from cases like Moran in
that the producers of the film, rather than the proprietor of the
theater, were being sued for allegedly failing to take reasonable
precautions to protect those in attendance at a theater watching
their film. Consequently, in determining potential liability, the
court in Bill should have focused on whether the producers,
through advertising, general promotion, or their share in the
revenue at the San Francisco theater, should be held responsi-
ble for the safety of the audience.
It is plausible to impose liability on the promoter of a public
event for dangerous conditions or inadequate crowd control
without limiting the potential negligence liability to the owner
or tenant of the property where the public is invited. The pro-
moter may be negligent in his or her organization of the activ-
ity or vicariously liable for co-participation in the joint
enterprise sponsoring the activity.
For example, in Bowes v. Cincinnati Riverfront Coliseum, 10 2
the concert promoter was held liable along with the City, which
owned the Coliseum, when the doors to the premises opened
late at a concert featuring the rock band the "Who." The delay
resulted in extreme congestion at the entrance and the death of
several concert-goers who were crushed when the crowd tried
to stream in too quickly. Other cases also suggest that promot-
ers may be responsible for dangerous conditions created by a
sponsored activity. In McLauglin v. Home Indemnity Insur-
ance Company, 103 the promoter and the owner-operator of the
premises where the concert was held were both held liable for
the plaintiff's slip and fall when the lights were not turned on
during intermission. In Bill, it is, of course, arguable whether
the security arrangements at the theater were in any manner
negligent. Nevertheless, the court record indicated facts, based
on earlier analogous cinematic productions, from which the
promoter might have recognized that a rowdy crowd would be
101. Moran, 431 Pa. at 436-37, 246 A.2d at 878. See also Silva v. Showcase Cinemas
Concessions of Dedham, Inc., 736 F.2d 810 (1st Cir. 1984), cert denied 469 U.S. 883
(1984) (The court held the theater liable when a movie patron was stabbed in the
theater's parking lot following a movie during which the victim's group had repeat-
edly asked the assailant's group to quiet down.).
102. 12 Ohio App. 3d 12, 465 N.E.2d 904 (1983).
103. 361 So. 2d 1227 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
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attracted. :" 4 Although the defendants in Bill did receive a
share of the revenue based on attendance, it appears that
Warner Brothers, not a defendant in Bill, was responsible for
distribution and publicity. 05 If Warner Brothers' actions as a
distributor were in the nature of a promoter, °6 then they could
be liable for any negligence in promoting the film in a manner
that unreasonably endangered public safety. While the func-
tions of some distributors may seem to be similar to promoters,
such as arranging and/or paying for publicity of a film, other
factors, such as providing the film to be shown, might not suf-
fice to open one up to the liability of promoters. 107
Courts must be wary of decisions like Bill which obscure the
distinction between media sponsored gatherings and activities,
as seen in Weirum, and the far more controversial imposition
of liability for alleged content-stimulated acts of violence as
will be seen in the discussion in category three. Operators of
entertainment attractions and others who promote these activi-
ties must continue to be held liable for an unreasonably unsafe
road race, stadium or theater. In evaluating what constitutes
reasonably safe conditions, reasonable predictions on the na-
ture of the crowd, including its age, temperament, and propen-
sity for violence, should be considered in evaluating the
potential liability for negligence.
III
Category Three: Stimulated Violence
In several decisions, courts have considered imposing negli-
gence liability for physical injuries arising as a result of violent
behavior stimulated by media portrayals. Media instructions'08
104. Bill, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 1005-06, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 627 (1982).
105. Id.
106. This Article does not conclude whether distributors of films should be deemed
promoters. It may often be a question of fact as to whether the film distributor has
taken on the characteristics of a film promoter.
107. There was some indication in Bill that the event may not have occurred on the
premises of the theater. A question of the duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff
may then arise. The recent California case of Owens v. Kings Supermarket, 198 Cal.
App. 3d 379, 243 Cal. Rptr. 627 (1988) points out that no duty was owed to a supermar-
ket patron for injuries caused by a third person when the injuries occurred in a public
street adjacent to the premises. It is the position of this Article that this may not
constitute a significant difference and that a duty may lie with the defendant even for
torts which occur in the immediate vicinity of the premises.
108. See supra notes 19-72 and accompanying text.
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or promotional activities °9 should be subject to liability for
negligence. With limited exceptions, however, media portray-
als stimulating imitative violence should be immunized from
negligence liability."i 0
The recent case of Herceg v. Hustler,"' may provide a useful
example. In that case, Hustler magazine published an article
describing the practice of auto-erotic asphyxia whereby the
practitioner rigs up a noose and cuts off his air supply at the
height of sexual excitement. A seventeen year old boy at-
tempted the technique and was found, by a friend, hanging
dead. The Hustler article emphasized the "often-fatal dangers
of auto-erotic asphyxia" and recommended that "readers seek-
ing unique forms of sexual release DO NOT ATTEMPT this
method. 1"12  The magazine also noted that "[t]he facts are
presented here solely for an educational purpose."1 3 Applying
the Brandenburg incitement test, the Fifth Circuit held that
the speech could not be found to constitute incitement, and
was, therefore, fully protected."
14
This case may be distinguished from cases like Disney, which
involved directions given over the air on how to make sound
effects at home." 5 In the Disney case, the mass media por-
trayal was designed to elicit action by directing and instructing
the viewer. To the contrary, Hustler did not appear to desire
that its readership follow the instructions which were
presented. The court noted that Hustler attempted to "dis-
suade its readers from conducting the dangerous activity it
109. See supra notes 73-107 and accompanying text.
110. Media portrayals rarely urge audiences to behave in a certain way, but may
instead merely provide a model for behavior while other unrelated factors will actu-
ally incite an audience member to action. As will be discussed, when the media
merely provides a model for behavior or the stiumulus for injurious behavior, the
speech is appropriately regulated under the incitement test of Brandenburg. See in-
fra notes 111-153 and accompanying text.
Under the modeling theory, a child is said to learn a behavior pattern, e.g., aggres-
siveness, from the media, just as he or she learns from parents or other adults. Later
behavior, set off by stimuli unrelated to the original media depiction, may actually
have its roots in behavior learned through the media. Prettyman & Hook, supra note
5, at 327-28 (1987). Other theories explain that media depictions may not be seen to
urge a behavior but generate the effect of desensitizing the audience member in such
a way that he is likely to be more accepting of violent behavior. This, in turn, may
lead to increased aggressiveness by the viewer. Id at 328-29.
111. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987).
112. Id. at 1018.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1023-24.
115. See supra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
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describes."' 16
Like the Herceg case, several cases involve media depictions
which are imitated by the audience member without any mani-
festations of intent on the part of the media to elicit such imita-
tions. These cases clearly fall outside of directions and
instructions cases, but efforts have been made to impose a neg-
ligence standard on media defendants for acts allegedly stimu-
lated by media defendants.
In De Filippo v. NBC,"7 a young plaintiff hanged himself af-
ter viewing a Johnny Carson episode which featured a stunt
man performing a skit in which he appeared to hang himself."8
Several times during the broadcast, the audience was advised
not to try the stunt themselves. The young plaintiff, however,
attempted the stunt and killed himself.1 9 He was later discov-
ered dead with the television set still tuned to the local NBC
affiliate which broadcast Carson's show.12 °
The court refused to apply a negligence standard, requiring a
showing of incitement in order for liability to attach to the me-
dia defendant for its speech.' 2 ' Applying. the Brandenburg in-
citement test, the court found no liability, holding that the test
had not been met.'22
In Olivia N. v. National Broadcasting Company,23 NBC
broadcast a film entitled "Born Innocent," which depicted the
harmful impact of a state-run home upon an adolescent girl. In
one scene, four other adolescent girls were shown using a
"plumber's helper" to artificially rape the girl while she was
attempting to take a shower.124 Four days after the program's
broadcast, the plaintiff, a nine-year-old girl, was "artificially
raped" with a bottle by teenagers at a San Francisco beach.'2
116. Hemveg, 814 F.2d at 1024. There was undoubtedly a statistical risk that could
have been foreseen, but there appeared to be no indication that Hustler intended, with
either desire or knowledge intent as defined by the Restatement, the directions to be
followed. See Jung & Levine, Whence Knowledge Intent? Whither Knowledge In-
tent?, 20 U.C. DAVis L. REv. 551 (1986).
117. 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982).
118. Id. at 1038.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1039-40.
122. Id. at 1042.
123. 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 178 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1981), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1108
(1982).
124. Id. at 491, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
125. Id. at 492, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
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The assailants later admitted having viewed and discussed the
artificial rape scene broadcast by NBC. 26
The California Court of Appeal rejected the plaintiff's effort
to obtain a judgment based on "negligence liability because
[of]... programming choices" by the broadcaster.127 Rather, the
court concluded that the "Born Innocent" program constituted
protected speech under the first amendment because the plain-
tiff conceded that "the film did not advocate or encourage vio-
lent acts and did not constitute an incitement"'' 8 as required by
Brandenburg v. Ohio.'L  Because the plaintiff in Olivia N. con-
ceded that there was no "incitement" and that the fictional ac-
count did not constitute obscenity, the court concluded that the
first amendment precluded liability.' °
In still another case, plaintiffs, rather than focusing on a par-
ticular broadcast, argued that overall television programming
had stimulated a crime. In Zamora v. Columbia Broadcasting
System,'13 a teenage boy and his parents sued the three televi-
sion networks alleging that negligent programming had re-
sulted in the boy becoming involuntarily addicted to and
"completely subliminally intoxicated"' 32 by viewing television
violence. The teenage plaintiff was convicted of murdering an
83-year-old neighbor. He and his parents alleged he "developed
a sociopathic personality... desensitized to violent behavior" as
a result of the networks' failure "to use ordinary care" to pre-
vent the teenager from "being 'impermissibly stimulated, in-
cited and instigated' to duplicate the atrocities he viewed on
television.' ' 33
The court in Zamora rejected the contention that the net-
works had a duty to avoid making "violent" shows and that
such programming could constitute negligence.' M The court
concluded that imposing potential negligent liability would re-
strain the defendants' exercise of their first amendment
rights.135 The court noted that the right of the public to view
126. Id
127. Id at 494, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
128. Id
129. 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
130. Olivia N., 126 Cal. App. 3d at 496, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
131. 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
132. Id. at 200.
133. I
134. Id at 202-03.
135. Id at 205.
[Vol. 10:969
1988] REDISCOVERING TRADITIONAL TORT TYPOLOGIES 993
programming "should not be inhibited by those members of the
public who are particularly sensitive or insensitive."'13
Cases like Herceg, DeFilippo, Olivia N. and Zamora fall
outside of the typology of the instruction cases in Category
One, and the sponsorship cases in Category Two. The balanc-
ing standard required by negligence theory to determine what
constitutes an unreasonable risk of harm is inappropriate in
these cases.
Under the traditional tort analysis, defendants who intend to
cause another to act out a certain behavior have always been
liable for negligence, whether promoting a race or instructing
another in a proper racing method. Where the media defend-
ant does not intend to elicit a behavior, but merely to convey
ideas, negligence theory is insufficient to protect unpopular
views and is therefore offensive to first amendment values.
The determination of negligence liability involves the balanc-
ing of the risks versus the potential advantages of conduct.13
In order to impose liability, the likelihood of harm must out-
weigh the potential benefits.'- To evaluate this balance, the
court must be prepared to measure the social benefit of the de-
fendant's behavior.'3 In the case of mass media presentations
not designed to elicit behavior, this requires making a value
judgment on the worth and utility of the ideas conveyed. 40 As
the court in Herceg pointed out, "[s]uch an endeavor would not
only be hopelessly complicated but would raise substantial con-
cern that the worthiness of speech might be judged by
majoritarian notions of political and social propriety and
morality.' 14 '
The risk, for example, of a television show provoking imita-
tive behavior, cannot, under negligence theory, be evaluated
without also evaluating the value of the ideas conveyed in that
production. Contemporary majoritarian notions might allow
an anti-war movie to include vivid violent depictions, despite
the possibility of imitation. On the other hand, the same por-
trayals and risks might be deemed unacceptable to some in a
film that depicts juvenile gang violence in an urban context,
138. I&
137. See PROSSER & KEETON, supr note 33, at 171.
138. I&
139. I&
140. See Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1024.
141. Id.
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since the utility of the ideas is deemed less compelling than the
possibility of imitative harm.
14 2
Although some have argued that acts of media stimulated vi-
olence must always be a product of incitement, and thus meet
the Brandenburg incitement test before liability will be im-
posed,1 43 some speech causing acts of stimulated violence may
actually fall into other categories of less protected speech. In
both obscenity and some aspects of commercial speech, a negli-
gence standard may be imposed on media defendants because
the balancing test required by negligence is not problematic
where first amendment values are not at issue.
If speech is characterized as legally obscene,'" it does not en-
joy first amendment protection. 4 5 Since such speech is unpro-
tected, it may be regulated like any other behavior normally
subject to a negligence standard. The balancing of the potential
harm from obscene speech with the utility of the ideas it
presents is not problematic since protected first amendment
communication is not involved. If, for example, an intensely
violent media presentation were held to be legally obscene
under the current Miller standard'" (or subsequent constitu-
tional refinements as to what constitutes obscenity), the danger
of balancing the utility versus the risk of harm under a negli-
gence standard would not threaten protected speech.
47
142. See, e.g., the recent controversy surrounding the film Colors depicting gang
violence in Los Angeles. The movie prompted discussion as to whether its showing
posed an unreasonable risk of danger which would justify its suppression. Gang
Movie Pulled After Disruption at Theater, L.A. Times, Apr. 17, 1988, § 2, at 12, col. 1.
At least one murder has been attributed to the movie. Police Blame Killing at Stock-
ton Theatre on "Colors", The Sacramento Bee, Apr. 26, 1988, at B1. This Article ar-
gues that liability for imitative behavior should be distinguished from the duty of
theater owners and promoters to provide reasonably safe environments from foresee-
able risks of criminal and tortious acts.
143. See Prettyman & Hook, supra note 5, at 344 n.109.
144. It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider the appropriateness of charac-
terizing some speech as obscene or precisely what speech, either sexually oriented, or
intensely violent, should constitute obscenity and, consequently, not be subject to first
amendment protection.
145. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 22 (1973).
146. The test from Miller is as follows:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average
person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifi-
cally defined by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Id. at 24.
147. See also the dissent in Herceg which would subject even indecent or porno-
[Vol. 10:969
1988] REDISCOVERING TRADITIONAL TORT TYPOLOGIES 995
Certain types of commercial speech'" may be deserving of
less constitutional protection. At one time, commercial speech
was thought to be completely unworthy of first amendment
protection.149 In recent years, however, commercial speech has
received increasing protection.1 "
Government regulation of commercial speech will not be up-
held today if the restriction fails to meet the test developed in
Central Hudson Gas & Electric v. Public Service Commis-
sion.1"' Under this doctrine, commercial speech which is truth-
ful, non-misleading and concerns a lawful activity will not be
regulable without a showing of a substantial governmental in-
terest in restricting such speech. 152 By implication, however,
misleading, non-truthful or unlawful speech is likely to be
unprotected.15
Thus, if commercial speech concerning an illegal activity re-
sulted in media-stimulated violence and injury, it would be
proper to subject the media defendant to a negligence standard,
since such speech is of reduced first amendment value.'m The
balancing test required by negligence could properly be ap-
plied, since, similar to obscene speech, fully protected first
amendment speech is not threatenedlss
graphic works to a lower standard of protection than for other types of speech. 814
F.2d at 1025 (Jones, J., dissenting).
148. The definition of commercial speech is problematic. One definition is "speech
of any form that advertises a product or service for profit or for business purposes." J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, sUpra note 16, at 904.
149. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.
YOUNG, supra note 16, at 904-05.
150. See J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 16, at 910-11.
151. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In Central Hudson, the Court invalidated a New York
regulation which prohibited all activity promoting the use of electricity. Id. at 566.
The Court held that for commercial speech to come within the first amendment it
"must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next we ask whether the as-
serted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers,
we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental inter-
est asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that inter-
est." Id, at 566.
152. Id.
153. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 106 S.
CL 2968 (1986). The Supreme Court upheld a government ban on the advertising of
gambling. The Court found a substantial governmental interest in restricting adver-
tising for gambling directed at residents of Puerto Rico. Id. at 2978. This may have
been in part due to the fact that the underlying activity, gambling, could have consti-
tutionally been banned altogether. Id at 2979.
154. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rights, 413 U.S. 376
(1973).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 143-47.
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For example, if an advertisement solicited a murder-for-hire,
as was alleged in a recent case involving an advertisement in
Soldier of Fortune Magazine, then the media defendant might
properly be subjected to a negligence standard of liability for
resulting physical harm.156 The requisite negligence balancing
test could be applied, as there is arguably little, if any, first
amendment value in such speech.
Thus, speech which stimulates individuals to act aggressively
and bring harm to themselves and others is regulable only to
the extent that it tends to incite or to the extent the speech
otherwise falls out of the purview of the first amendment, as in
the examples above. A negligence cause of action is otherwise
inappropriate here because courts would be forced to balance
the worth and utility of ideas conveyed by media defendants
with the likelihood of harm that might result from the speech.
If the speech is fully protected, such balancing is unacceptable.
Conclusion
On many occasions the courts have continued to ignore tradi-
tional categories of tort liabilities when media liability is being
determined. Cases where directions or instructions are given as
in Category One, or sponsored activities as in Category Two,
may properly be subjected to liability under negligence theory
because there is an intent to elicit action. Media instructions
and media-sponsored activities should not be confused with
claims based on Category Three cases asserting imitative vio-
lence where negligence is an improper remedy.
Claims based on negligently provided instructions or direc-
tions which result in injury, should be subject to liability under
traditional negligence concepts. There should be no distinction
between directions which are given through mass media from
those given in a more interpersonal setting. Indeed, it is at
least arguable that directions promulgated by mass media are
akin to warnings and instructions accompanying tangible prod-
ucts subject to strict liability. Media communicated instruc-
tions, however, are more like services than distinct tangible
products and, consequently, should probably not be subject to
strict liability. Nevertheless, the conceptual similarity between
156. Soldier of Fortune Magazine was held liable in a wrongful death action for an
ad which ran in its magazine soliciting a hired killer. Belkin, Magazine is Ordered to
Pay 9.4 Million for Killer's Ad, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1988, at 12, col. 1.
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the mass produced products and mass communicative instruc-
tion at least supports an argument that media defendants not
gain immunity from negligence liability that ordinarily could
be imposed in a non-media context.
The media has also sometimes been insulated from liability
in the case of media-sponsored activities which result in physi-
cal injury, despite the fact that such injuries would be compen-
sable if a non-media sponsor was involved. While the
California Supreme Court upheld a wrongful death verdict in a
case involving a media-sponsored race, courts have sometimes
been hesitant to find promoter liability, arguing that it may
bring about a chilling effect on speech. These courts have
failed to differentiate between acts of violence stimulated by
the content of a media defendant's production and those
brought about by a media defendant's failure to provide a rea-
sonably safe environment for a gathering or activity that it
sponsors.
Claims involving media-stimulated acts of imitative violence
should generally only be subject to liability under the Branden-
burg incitement test. While the first and second categories re-
flect claims where media involvement should not immunize
defendants in areas where liability has been traditionally im-
posed, the third category would require courts to evaluate the
merits of ideas in a negligence formula-a prospect which ap-
pears to be constitutionally impermissible. An exception are
cases where communications lose full first amendment protec-
tion, such as obscenity and specific types of commercial speech.
In these cases, media depictions causing imitative violence may
properly be subject to a negligence standard.
Media tort cases, like other tort cases, should not be lumped
indiscriminately together. Instead, the courts should benefit
from the wealth of case law addressing the different kinds of
potential liability. By properly differentiating these cases, both
the defendant's first amendment rights, as well as the rights of
injured plaintiffs, will be better guarded.

